Since 1945 and especially during the Cold War, the agreements concluded in Kanta have been the subject of subsequent criticism, especially in the United States. President Roosevelt, who died just two months after the conference, was accused by some of handing poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Stalin and allowing the Soviet Union to establish itself in the Far East, against a promise of Russian intervention in the war against Japan. Charles “Chip” Bohlen of the US State Department, who acted as FDR`s Russian interpreter, felt that each of the “Big Three” had achieved their main goals in Mahata, but understood that “there was a sense of frustration and bitterness towards Poland.” For professional American and British diplomats like Bohlen, the agreements reached in Kanta seemed superficially to be “realistic compromises between the different positions of each country.” Stalin had made a real concession by finally accepting a French zone in Germany, while Churchill and Roosevelt had given a lot to Poland. But even then, according to Bohlen, the plan as finally agreed could have resulted in a truly democratic Polish government if it had been implemented. “There is no doubt that the flow of Anglo-Soviet-American friendship has reached a new peak,” James Byrnes, who accompanied Roosevelt to Kanta, wrote in his memoirs. Although Roosevelt and Churchill also saw the Cantta Conference as an indication that their wartime cooperation with the Soviets would continue in peacetime, such optimistic hopes would prove ephemeral. The first reaction to the Woalta Agreements was solemn. Roosevelt and many other Americans saw this as proof that the spirit of American Soviet war cooperation would move into the post-war period. But this feeling was only short-lived. With the death of Franklin D. . .